



THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION: STUMBLING BLOCK TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA.

BOLAJI, Ibrahim Olanrewaju Akanbi¹, ADAM, Aishatu Buba²

Department Of Social Studies, Kwara State College Of Education, Oro, Nigeria.
socialustaz2017@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT

The assumption of the African leadership role by Nigeria seems ordained because, as at her independence in 1960, she had possessed all the requisite qualification, like population, resources (human and material), Land mass, and might more than the countries that had been independent for over 100 years before her. The performance of these functions, which was supported by other African Countries, was the best attestation to this status, but was hampered by political activities within Nigeria itself. It is given that this paper attempts to evaluate the activities of the Nigerian leaders since independence till date and the effect of their administration on the socio-economic well-being of the Nigerian populace. It equally diagnoses the impact of these activities on the contest, which some African countries are putting towards the leadership position which Nigeria has toiled so much to occupy. The study, however, concludes that until Nigeria stipulates a political culture which must be constitutionally engraved in our social administration, the much-echoed economic development that would confirm Nigeria's leadership of the African continent might continue to be unrealistic.

Introduction

The commencement of indigenous political activities in Nigeria was intertwined with gross irregularities and electoral fraud because the election that led to the emergence of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) as the first Prime Minister was stoically accepted by the opposition parties (UNDP, 2016). The political debacle was corroborated by the census and western regional crisis of 1962, the general election crisis of 1964,

and the western regional election crisis of 1965, which culminated in a military coup and the subsequent military rule for many years (Dare and Oyewole, 2002 & Bolaji, 2023). Notable among the offences levelled against the politicians by the military were embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, gross misconduct, and misbehaviour in public offices, victimisation of political opponents and a host of other offences. Although the military became the worst offenders of the offences levelled against the politicians, most of them eventually metamorphosed into politics, hence our definition of politicians includes the military.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Politics, according to Henslim (2008) refers to power relations wherever they exist; it is the ability to get your way even over the resistance of others. It involves the authoritative allocation of values which people struggle to acquire. Naturally, politics seems conflicting considering its contested and contextual nature (Michelle, 2024 & Troy & Atin, 2025). This best explains why conflict theory is mostly relevant for political analysis. For conflict theory, society is a forum of inequality, considering the fact that resources (power, education, etc.) are not evenly endowed. For the understanding of social behaviour, the continuous contest and competition for political positions, economic values, social status, etc, present the best means. Conflict theory specifies the place of power, competition and social inequality in shaping society. Conflicts prescribed maintenance of social order by dominance of certain groups by a group as against co-operation between the components of the society. (Iskandarsyah & Zulkarnain, 2022).

The Nigerian political position, as it is known, is mostly contested and scrambled for by Nigerians from different ethnic backgrounds, especially the presidency, which is the first and most influential position in the country. However, the keen contest for this position does not signify keen interest in the socio-economic development of the Nigerian society, but majorly in the total change of lifestyle for the president and his cohorts, as past and present public office holders have shown. The fear of being marginalised in political positions, civil service appointments and revenue allocations turned the election into a win-at-all-costs affair for contestants since the loyalty is not to Nigeria as a society, but the immediate origin and tribe. In their arguments towards political instability in Nigeria, Akinsanya and Ayoade (2005) emphasised that Nigeria attained independence as a nation of three separate regions (Eastern, Northern and Western) and the nation's Capital Territory of Lagos. Each of the regions was dominated by a major ethnic group. The Hausa-Fulani predominantly North was controlled and dominated by the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Eastern region, mainly Ibo's

commanded and won by the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Western region, mainly Yoruba's, controlled by the Action Group (AG). Each of the parties is expected to propagate their ethnic political programmes in the overall political administration of Nigeria. Unfortunately, none of the parties emerged with a clear majority in the December 12, 1959, Federal Elections, as clearly shown in Table 1, thus creating a political stalemate.

TABLE 1: December 1959 Federal Election Returns By Seats

PARTY	NORTHERN NIGERIA *	WESTERN NIGERIA**	EASTERN NIGERIA	LAGOS TERRITORY	NATIONAL TOTAL
NPC	134	-	-	-	134
NCNC/NEPU***	8	21	58	2	89
AG/UMBC***	25	33	14	1	73
OTHERS	7	8	1	-	16

* Only male adults were enfranchised.

** Western Nigeria then included the present Edo and Delta states (Mid-Western State).

*** The expressions NEPU and UMBC stand for the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the United Middle Belt Congress, respectively.

Source: Adeoye, A. A. "The Inevitability of Instability in Nigeria" *The Need for a Constitutional Political Culture*.

Nigerian Political Administration: An Overview

The defects presently witnessed in the Nigerian political administration were the by-product of what the colonialists handed over to the first set of leaders of the Nigerian Nation. In his account, Ige (1995) stressed that as far as the British were concerned, they appreciated the hard work, openness and constructive proposals of the Action Group, but they could not put their bet on that party and chief Awolowo because they could not be sure that he would not turn out to be a radical like Kwame Nkrumah. It is true, they surmised that Awolowo was inward-looking and had never shown flair for African and international politics. But his party's social programmes were bound to stir Nigeria into assuming its proper position as the giant of Africa, and probably contest development with the Western world, even her colonial master, Britain. The Action Group government of Western Nigeria had also demonstrated that it could speedily

transform a British-dominated civil service into an indigenous one. British civil servants did not like this, and people like F.K. Butler, who said free primary education was impossible, did not love the Action Group and its leaders.

The British had a good working relationship with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa since 1952 as a minister. Despite not being the leader of the NPC, he distinguished himself and always appeared modest always and always giving the impression of indecision during the 1954, 1956 and 1957 constitutional conferences; Abubakar Tafawa Balewa spoke little, but took copious notes. He had with him officials who accompanied him from the Lagos secretariat. They must all have been noting all the loopholes in the proposed constitution. This was the calibre of the personnel that the British handed Nigeria over to. As soon as the East and the West were accorded “self-government” in 1956, the Action Group proceeded to take a bold and necessary step for the easy implementation of its programmes. It appointed an agent general in the United Kingdom to look after its affairs. The Western region appointed an able lawyer, Chief M.E.R. Okorodudu, as his agent, and he gave his government far more publicity than the federal government got, which led to the federal and Eastern governments of Nigeria being envious of the Western government of Nigeria. The fact that the western region had more students in the United Kingdom and students on scholarship than even the federal government was enough to be envious of (Ige, 1995).

Probably, the British detest leadership contests from any of their colonies and since Nigeria was viewed as a potential, the delivery of political power to the tribe that does not contest issues with them right from the colonial days, on whom they can put their trust. This became the basis under which the tribe has been re-emphasising itself in political power, hence the claiming of leadership as their birthright. This argument also supports our electoral misconduct. African democracies, for Adebani (2004) are associated with a considerable number of violent crises. From Liberia to Nigeria, from Sierra Leone to Angola, from the Ivory Coast to Algeria, ethno-religious and political formations are up in war against one another in democratic states that describe themselves as democracies. Perhaps one way to instantly dismiss the matter is to simply argue that these policies are not in the proper sense democratic states. At best, they are what have been described as ‘non-democratic democracies’; therefore, they would not be expected to enjoy the relative political tranquillity which democratic states are expected to enjoy. But this would be too dismissive and indeed, would blind us to the very challenging conditions under which these polities attempt to build and consolidate democratic governance, and would also encourage us to

ignore the fact that democracy itself is a perpetual work in progress. Indeed, in contemporary Africa, democracy is a struggle, a means of livelihood and not a social service.

Political Administration is connected with the organisation, and the planning of the state, government or public affairs (Hornby, 2010). Considering the prototype of politics which Nigerian leaders inherited from the British, our politics is focused on administering firstly the self, the organisation, and planning of their immediate family, tribe, ethnic group or state rather than the larger society. This, of course, at the expense of the nation and as a result, the tribe of the contestant strongly supports winning the election at all costs to enable the candidate to serve his ethnic interest. This same fact supports the mismanagement and diversion of public funds by our leaders into their personal use, which average Nigerian citizens consider normal in social administration. Also, an ideal political administration is supposed to be a by-product of a credible election.

Nigeria's renewed attempt at democratic polity in 1999 generated so much enthusiasm comparable to the mood in the country on the eve of national independence in 1960. However, the experiences in the first three years of its enthronement have diminished the enthusiasm of Nigerians in the same way; the enthusiasm with which they bid farewell to the infamous colonial rule was diminished. In a very short time, reverberations in the political firmament have stultified democratic progression and supplanted it with regression (Ayandiji, 2004). Right from the first republic, the incumbent administration exhibits various atrocities in government, prominent among which are the systems of ensuring a continuous stay in government so as to continue the mismanagement and embezzlement of public funds. Dare and Oyewole (2002) argue that a population census was conducted in 1962, but the figures leaked out, and there were many criticisms that the figures were rigged. As a result, it was cancelled and another census was ordered in 1963. Before then, a census board under the authority of the Prime Minister was set up. The census was taken in November 1963 and in February 1964; the provisional figures put the population of the country as 55,653,821. The Northern Region with 29,777,968, the Eastern Region with 12,388,646, the Western Region with 10,278,500, the Mid-Western Region with 2,533,337 and Lagos City with 675,352 people. The figures again generated a lot of criticism, but in the long run, the federal government, the Northern and the Western regional governments accepted the figures, but the Mid-Western and the Eastern governments rejected the results because they were inflated and there were gross irregularities. Of course, the census results were perfected in anticipation of the coming election rather than using them to plan for the country.

The aforementioned assertion was attested to by kingdom (2011) who asserted that election history vis-à-vis Nigerian politics revealed that the process of choosing leaders is often characterised by violence. The circumstances that brought about the Nigerian civil war was ignited by electoral malpractices co-ordinated by the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa led government in the first general and regional elections organized by indigenous leaders in 1964 and 1965. In the usual fraudulent manner, the ruling party was returned to virtually all positions from the federal to the regional without recourse. This instigated protest, violence and widespread killings degenerating into wanton destruction of lives and properties that claimed no fewer than 200 innocent lives (Carver, 1966 & Aluko, 2009). Added to this, Dare and Oyewole (2002) further advocated that based on the accepted census figures of 1963, the North was allotted 167 parliamentary seats out of 312, a reduction of 7 seats from what it had before; the East was allotted 70 seats as against 73 in the 1959 election; the West gained 10 seats being allowed 57 as against 47 in 1959, the Midwest area lost one seat, 14 seats in 1964 as against the 15 it had in 1959, Lagos, the federal capital was given 4 seats as against 3 in the 1959 elections. During the nomination process for these seats and the electioneering campaign that followed a lot of irregularities were reported, such as the inability of the UPGA candidates to get nomination papers or the electoral officers being conveniently absent when UPGA candidates wanted to file nomination papers in the Northern and Western regions controlled by the NPC and NNDP. At the close of nomination period, many seats in the North and West were declared unopposed.

It is in consideration of act of this nature that prompted Akintilebo (2011) to specify that one of the dangerous phenomena in the electoral process in the Nigeria politics is the criminality involved in the practice. The Nigerian politics over the years have been immersed in endemic electoral violence. Rather than elections to be embraced as one of the important processes that strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate peaceful transition of power; they are seen as violent means of acquiring the spoils of democracy. Just as the first, second and third republics, Nigeria's fourth republic was bedevilled by several forms of violence and crimes, among which are murder, arson, electoral violence, assassination, intra-and inter-party clashes among party members in the political process. Probably, the most disruptive and challenging of all the political disturbances which Nigeria had experienced was the June 12 1993, political disturbance in which Nigeria lost many souls and properties, which is incalculable. It could as well be concluded that the June 12 political crisis stands out to be the most disturbing to the socio-economic development of the Nigerian society. It marks the beginning of the epileptic functioning of all Nigerian petroleum refineries, which commences the era of importation of petroleum products

that have impacted negatively on our economy. However, it must be stated that this political disturbance, which engraved a permanent socio-economic stigma on Nigeria, was the making of the military.

Emmanuel Ojo (2004) noted that after General Ibrahim Babangida took over power in August 1985, he released a new political programme which would anchor Nigeria's political proceedings, institutional adjustment, and the re-orientation of the nation's political culture. In the quest for searching for a new political order, he constituted a 17-member political bureau basically for reviewing Nigeria's past political failures in 1987 for the purpose of achieving a new plan or scheme for the country's politics. Inclusive in the programme was the political transition process as well as constituting constitution review committee (CRC) for reviewing the 1979 constitution and the establishment of a National Electoral Commission (NEC) saddled with organising a non-partisan local government election at the end of 1987. Furthermore, the National Population Commission (NPC), Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) were equally established while modalities for forming political parties, revenue allocation formula and state creation were being discussed by the commission.

As a testimony to the government's commitment to actualising the political programme, the government through a decree registered two (2) political parties i.e. Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) having refused to endorse the two (2) leading political parties, i.e. People's Solidarity Party (PSP) and the Nigerian National Congress (NNC) (Diamond, 1991 & Ihonvbare, 1991). It should be noted that the handover date specified in the political transition programme was highly characterised by modifications, alterations and revisions. Firstly, October 1992 was pronounced as against the initial date of October 1990, this was later reviewed to January 1993, and further amended to August 27, 1993, when the regime had spent eight years in power. Another contradiction or disparity in the transition timetable was the outlawing and prohibition of presidential aspirants in the course of the transition programme. On 27th June 1990, the military government proscribed all former Second Republic politicians from open and hidden political participation, which includes holding any public office for ten years commencing from the resumption of party politics (Onuoha, Bassey, Ozinegbe, & Uno, 2020). This step is meant to serve as a deterrent to others who might be induced to facilitate the emergence of new breed politicians.

To climax the elongated transition programme, another election was fixed for June 12, 1993 between the candidate of the S D P chief MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa, the N R C

candidate. Two days before the June 12 election, an organization, Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) alleged to be registered presented a case before Justice Bassey Ikpeme preventing the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the election on June 12, the Judge later ruled that the election be postponed till the determination of the case. However, the N E C considered the postponement of an election that is barely 48 hours away from commencement to be grossly irrational; therefore, the election took place with the least acrimony and was staged to avert any crisis that could ensue from the postponement (Guardian 13th & 14th June, 1993).

It might interest us to know that Justice Bassey Ikpeme, who ruled over the staging of the June 12 1993, election at the federal high court in Abuja, was appointed a high court judge just in December 1992, and the ABN suit was her first major case to be heard. The fact that the judge ruled over the case at the wake of night almost disrupted the proceedings and preparing logistics for the election. Despite the challenges, NEC released a considerable part of the election, and 58% of the total votes cast in 14 states were won by Chief MKO Abiola of the Social Democratic Party, publicly displayed at N E C headquarters in Abuja. Election results from the remaining 16 states were halted and never released to date. This was due to the ruling of Justice Dahir Saleh, the chief judge of the federal capital territory, that the election result should no longer be announced until after the determination of the A B N's case. After a while, the leader of the A B N, Chief Arthur Nzeribe, called for total cancellation of the election because it was fraudulent and unconstitutional. Eleven days after the election, precisely 23rd June, 1993, General Babangida annulled the election and suspended the National Electoral Commission (Ojo, 2004).

Table2: Political Crisis in Nigeria.

Year of crisis	Causes/nature of crisis	Parties involved in the crisis	Effects of crisis on the society	Casualties recorded due to crisis
1962	Serious conflicts within the Action Group	Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Party Leader) & Chief S. L. Akintola (Deputy Party Leader)	Social disintegration of the Western region of Nigeria	UNKNOWN
1962-1964	Census crisis (Inflation and Rigging of census	The Nigerian Society	Leads to wrong projections for developmental purposes,	UNKNOWN

Figures)			boundary adjustments and constituency delimitations	
1964	General Election Crisis of 1964, an Election characterised by irregularities	United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) and Nigerian National Alliance (NNA)	Victimisation of opposition parties, Enmity, agonism and social disruptions.	1000 people lost their lives
1965	Western Regional Election of 1965	Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) and Action Group (AG)	Widespread killing, arson, looting and wanton destruction of property.	Over 2000 lives were lost, and many were arrested
1967- 1970	The Killings of officers of Ibo Origins in the coup of July 29, 1966	Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (Head of Nigeria's Military Government) and Lt. Col. O. Ojukwu (Gov. of the Eastern Region).	Led to the total disruption of the socio-economic activities of the country.	1-3 million civilian casualties, 20,000 individuals lost their lives during the civil war.

Source: E.O. Qjo (2016). *The Awolowo-Akintola leadership tussle: A re-interpretation. Journal of Arts & Humanities*, 5(1). Ekiti State University.

African Leadership Role Performance: The Definition of Nigeria's Playership.

After independence and the confirmation of Nigeria as the 99th member of the United Nations Organisation, Nigeria's prime minister at the General Assembly of the organization on the 7th of October, 1960 in New York specified the basic tenets of Nigeria's political administration and foreign policy in his maiden address to the plenary of the 15th regular session of the UNO as stated:

Firstly, Nigeria desires to be cordial and amiable with all nations by participating actively in the work and assignments of the UNO;

Secondly, Nigeria, a large and densely populated nation of over 35 million (in 1960), now 237,527,782 (Worldometer, 2025), with the potential of geographical and expansionist intentions;

Thirdly, Nigeria will not forget or abandon our old friends, as we are proud to have been admitted as a member of the British Commonwealth,

Fourthly, the country desires to work with other African states for the development of the continent and equally assist other aspiring African countries to gain independence.

The fourth and last policy statement is the concern of this paper. Reference was made to when Portugal, in the course of debates in the United Nations General Assembly, claimed that Angola was a province of Portugal and the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Honourable (Dr.) JaJa Nwachukwu retorted that Nigerians could never accept the fiction that any square inch of an African territory could be considered part of a metropolitan European country. In the case of apartheid South Africa, he recalled that Nigeria, along with twenty-five other African countries, had drafted and sponsored a strongly worded resolution which sought to impose sanctions on that regime, but the Western powers and fellow travellers supported a weak Indian resolution, which did not go far enough. On the other hand, he emphasised that Nigeria played a leading role in the withdrawal of the apartheid South African regime from the Commonwealth during the wealth prime ministers conference in London in March 1961. Moreover, in June 1961, the minister of labour late Mr. J.M. Johnson, moved a resolution to compel South Africa to quit the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The motion was carried, but when South Africa refused to quit, the Nigerian delegation walked out of the ILO meeting. South African was therefore obliged to leave.

Given Nigeria's acclaimed leadership role in West Africa, much of her integrity has been staked in the defence of West African interests across the globe to the extent that it seems unstrategic for her to withdraw from the worthwhile venture. The formation of ECOWAS in 1975, through the pioneering efforts of Nigeria and Togo, remains an expression of the country's concern for the sub-region she is simply the major financier of the organization and thus harbor its headquarters in Abuja not only was Nigeria the spokesperson for the African continent, her global clout also made her the spokes person for group of 77 countries, non-aligned movement and the ECOWAS Group formed in 1997 by the Abacha administration as a way of defeating global isolation (saliu, 2006b).

In terms of international bureaucrats, Saliu (2010) emphasised that Nigeria's profile at the UN has been a good one. Simeon Adebo, Joe Garba, Ibrahim Gambari, Olu Adeniji, Chris Garba, among other personalities, have been engaged at one time or the other in helping to discharge the mandate of the United Nations. Of worthy importance is the fact that late Joe Garba headed the 44th session of the UN General Assembly to the admiration of the world (Garba, 1993) Ibrahim Gambari is a notable Nigeria in the UN system in the capacity of the UN under-secretary who has just been appointed as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General on African Affairs (Dafur

Crisis). Aided by the numerical strength of the African Countries, the Country, acting in concert with other African Countries, has made the UN more concerned about Africa. The issues of economic underdevelopment and poverty have been consistently placed on the front burner of the UN activities. Although not totally successful, there are a number of interventions by the global body in the continued search for relevance and breakthrough by African Countries.

In the struggles to raise Africa's voices, Nigeria was a champion in the race for an African Secretary General of the UN. Not minding the difficulties involved in selling General Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigeria's candidate, the country never lost the focus of fighting for an African UN chief scribe, which became a reality with the appointment of the Egyptian Boutros-Ghali as the UN Secretary in 1992 (Udedibia, 2010). Perhaps, the greatest impact which the country has made at the level of the UN is in the area of security functions. She not only heads the UN peacekeeping committee, but she also heads the military advisory council on peacekeeping. By implication, the country has achieved global recognition as a frontliner in peacekeeping. This earned the country the position of the United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone, which Olu Adeniji headed while General Luther Agwai headed the U N Mission in Darfur. Considering this, Nigeria can be regarded as a great player at the U N which is bound to continue for years to come (Saliu, 2010). Nigeria's leadership role also manifested when it spearheaded the creation of the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) as part of its care and concern for its sister nations. This group was employed in curbing the excesses of Liberian Master Sergeant and later President Samuel Doe. After some seven years of bloody civil crisis, ECOMOG successfully conducted a Presidential election, which Charles Taylor won. Also, in Sierra-Leone, ECOMOG equally challenged Major Koromah's military administration that jotted the democratic setting in that country. She successfully reinstated the Tejjan Kabbah democratic government (Saliu, 2006a).

EffectsofInternalpoliticalCrisis on Socio-Economic Development and Continental Leadership

The call for representative and democratic governance originates from the belief that it assures the right of humans, guarantees peace and stability, as well as securing steady development, which all serve as prerequisites, criteria and conditions for self-determination, personal and general economic well-being of a society (Alanamu, 2005). More elaborately, Coser (1966) believes that conflicts perform some functions in society: In this thesis, he stressed that conflicts prevent social stagnation. He defined social conflict as a contest for values on the demand for status, power and scarce resources which the group intended to use in subjugating,

injuring and eliminating antagonists. Ige (1995) argues that throughout 1965, curfew was hardly lifted in most parts of the Western region, which impacted negatively on the socio-economic development of the region and the country at large. Dare and Oyewole (2002) reported that at the close of the nomination period for the 1965 Western regional election, many seats were declared unopposed. This was terribly frustrating for people who had long waited to constitutionally vote Chief Akintola out of power. But this was not all, the election itself was so grossly rigged that the people, seeing no hope to realise their ambition, began to take the law into their own hands. There was widespread killing, arson, looting and wanton destruction of lives and properties.

Ojo (2004) submits that the political crisis which the annulment of the June 12 presidential election plunged the nation into was undoubtedly the most catastrophic, with widespread and devastating consequences that resulted in widespread loss of lives and properties. In its thirty-three (33) years as a sovereign state, apart from the civil war of 1966-1970, the survival and existence of Nigeria as a political entity has never been put to such danger or peril, totally destabilising the socio-economic proceedings. Reacting to the annulment of his mandate, Chief MKO Abiola said that if the lawmakers are breakers, he might follow suit, hence the compulsion of going about planning a protest in the country. Good governing decisions by the military seem more of a mistake, as the source that established them in power does not correlate with that. After this, protests began in every nook and cranny of the country, led by the Campaign for Democracy (CD). The CD declared a day's mass peaceful non-violent protest, which was approached violently by the police, leading to the death of not less than one hundred (100) peaceful protesters.

Invariably, the concern of this paper, being the disturbance and deception which the political crisis had inflicted on the socio-economic well-being of Nigeria due to the style of administration employed by our politicians, was largely informed by egocentrism. Although, Adebisi (1999) contends that the seeds of ethnic violence were sown by the British Colonial Policies in Nigeria with the adoption of a divide and rule tactics, which later robbed Nigerians of the common front for nation building and the subsequent emergence of regional leaders and regional political parties however, this excuse does not suffice the aversion of the various crisis which our leader foments in pursuance of their selfish interests. Just as Ige (1995) pointed out that the period 1951 – 1955 witnessed very great political activity in Nigeria. Our political leaders used those years to lay the foundation of what we have today. Unfortunately, they did not have an agreeable not to talk of an agreed plan to build upon. So, the British Official provided some

design for the whole country, and our respective leaders tore out the portions which they knew very well, drew the plan for such areas, and then came together to put the plans together.

However, the focal point of the manifestoes of our leaders never allowed them to deeply think of making provision for the other regions of the country in their party programmes, hence, the more they try to develop their various regions economically, the more such efforts cause disturbance and crisis in the entire Nigeria society. All said and done, the political administration in Nigeria has been greatly disturbing and destructive to the Nigerian populace and economy. The economy is meant to be propagated by citizens, and in a situation where citizens are disturbed and disrupted, the economy of such a society will suffer. As emphasised in table 2, it can determine the contribution any of the victims of the political crisis would have contributed to the growth of the economy if otherwise.

According to Adeyemo (2002), without question, Nigeria became the prime mover and driving force for the ECOMOG peace-keeping initiative in Liberia, and so the peace-keeping troops had a large Nigerian contingent (about 7,800 troops). Nigeria was in Liberia to end the carnage, lawlessness and anarchy in the country. Also, when the Sierra Leonean political crisis emerged, Nigeria once again provided the needed leadership and support for the restoration of peace and democracy in Sierra-Leone. Like Sierra-Leone, democracy was equally threatened in Guinea-Bissau on June 7 (a day before General Sani Abacha's death) 1998 when the country's former Chief of Army Staff-General Ansoumane wane led a rebellion against the democratically elected government of president Joan Bernardo Vierra of Guinea Bissau which got her independence from Portugal in 1975 Nigeria equally rose to the challenge.

Charity, they say, begins at home. Despite all the efforts geared by Nigeria (including monetary, military, and other support) in ensuring that Africa remains intact, the leadership position of the continent was not accorded to her because she has failed in putting her house in order. Corruption in the form of electoral fraud, embezzlement, mismanagement and maladministration perpetrated by her leaders has impacted negatively on the economy and the organisation of the Nigerian society to the extent of losing her rightful place in the continent.

Conclusion

In the view of Akinsanya (2005) Nigeria's record of comparative 'moderation' stands out in sharp contrast to the far more dramatic and militant assertiveness of certain smaller African states such as Ghana and Guinea..., it was a record that... brought no little disappointment to

those Nigerian patriots who had hoped that their country would assume a more 'dynamic' role of leadership in African... Affairs, a role they believed was destined by size and population to play. But her display of political immaturity in administrative terms which manifested her irresponsible attitude of not being able to organise her home convince the smaller countries of Africa of her incapacity to officially assume the leadership role of the continent.

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